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Aid, growth and peace: A comparative analysis1
 
By Astri Suhrke and Julia Buckmaster 
Chr. Michelsen Institute 
 
 
Summary 
 
The paper examines patterns of post-conflict aid in a sample of 14 countries, with in-depth, 
qualitative analysis of seven cases (Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
Mozambique and Rwanda). The study takes previous work by Paul Collier and associates in 
this area as a starting point, but disaggregates the data by type of aid, time intervals, and 
historical period. The findings significantly qualify the Collier conclusion to the effect that 
donors respond to a CNN-effect in a dysfunctional manner by rushing in aid soon after a 
peace agreement is concluded and scaling back too soon.  Rather, disaggregated analysis 
shows that post-war aid follows several patterns and can best be understood as strategic 
behavior designed to promote a range of economic and political objectives. This paper also 
questions the related policy recommendation of the Collier research on post-conflict aid, 
namely that post-conflict aid should be phased in so as to maximize economic growth on the 
grounds that this is important to sustain peace during the first post-conflict decade. Instead, 
this paper finds, aid strategies that demonstrate early and firm donor commitment to the new 
order are more likely to stabilize peace in the short run, and aid strategies that address the 
underlying sources of conflict are important to sustain peace in the longer run. 
 
            
 ***************************************************
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Transformation of War Economies, University of 
Plymouth and the International Peace Academy, Experts’ Seminar 16-18 June 2005, Plymouth, Devon
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Increasingly, the proper sequencing of aid in terms of timing and magnitude is seen as an 
important aspect of peacebuilding strategies in the aftermath of civil wars. Donors have 
pursued different strategies, sometimes seeking to "jump-start" the economy through massive 
infusion of aid in the immediate post-conflict phase (as in Bosnia); at other times favouring a 
slow pace of phasing in even of modest aid flows, citing absorption capacity (as in 
Cambodia). Recipient governments typically argue for immediate and large-scale inflows to 
cement the peace settlement, or, as in post-Taliban Afghanistan, to prevent structures 
embedded in the wartime political economy from creating a "narco-mafia state". The 
literature provides few guidelines. While there have been numerous case studies of post-war 
aid, most have been project oriented and yield little understanding of what constitutes 
appropriate strategies to sustain the post-conflict peace (Woodward 2002.). Research 
supported by the World Bank claims to have identified optimal timing and magnitude of aid 
required to sustain post-war peace, and which diverge markedly from actual practice (World 
Bank 2003,  and Hoeffler 2004) Their general nature (being based on statistical analysis of 
highly aggregated data) and a small number of observations limit the relevance of the 
findings, however.  
 
This article takes the World Bank research in this area as a starting point, but disaggregates 
the data and supplements with a small-N qualitative analysis.  We first examine overall trends 
in types of post-conflict aid over time, then identify patterns in seven country cases, and 
conclude by analysing the relationship between aid, economic growth and peace in light of the 
case studies. As other studies have shown (Sambanis 2004), disaggregated data and 
comparative case studies can significantly enrich the analysis.  This article identifies several 
patterns of post-conflict aid, each of which reflects a specific historical context and related 
policy rationales. While several aid patterns diverge from the optimal sequencing 
recommended by the World Bank research, the aid nevertheless helped to stabilize peace in 
the short run, and all were compatible with a sustained the peace in the longer-run.  
 
1. Patterns of aid 
The World Bank supported research on the sequencing of aid in post-conflict situations is part 
of a larger argument on the relationship between aid, growth and peace.2 To maximize the 
                                                 
2 The argument was initially presented in a World Bank research paper (Working Paper 2902, October 2002), 
when Collier was head of the research department in the Bank. The paper was in 2003 posted on the website 
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positive impact on peace, the World Bank team argues, aid to countries emerging from civil 
war should be massive (twice the level of aid to countries that are not post-conflict), and 
should be phased in slowly to peak in the middle of the first post-conflict decade before 
tapering back to "normal" levels.  In fact, they claim, donors do precisely the opposite. They 
rush in with aid when peace is declared, but rapidly scale back instead of staying for the long 
haul. The reason is a generalized “CNN effect” -“politicians like to respond to the 
newsworthy event of peace….[while] aid bureaucracies try to get aid allocations back to 
normal” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, p. 1137). 
 
The conclusion has affirmed conventional wisdom in aid circles to the effect that donors 
frontload aid in a dysfunctional manner. But to what extent is frontloading typical of post-
conflict donor behaviour across the wide variety of post-conflict cases?  To assess donor 
behaviour in more detail, we used the same kind of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
data as Collier and Hoeffler did, but used annual figures rather than four-year averages, and 
distinguished between type of aid and historical periods. 3  
 
First, we separated relief aid from the aggregate ODA figures.4  As we wanted to test the 
"frontloading" hypothesis as precisely as possible, we used the civil war sample of Collier and 
Hoeffler, which contains 14 countries and 17 post-conflict situations.5 Altogether, the post-
conflict years of the countries in the sample span almost three decades, from 1971, when the 
first civil war ended, to 1997, when the Collier and Hoeffler data set stops. When allowing for 
type of aid disbursed to post-conflict countries in these years, we see that only relief aid is 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/research.htm  as Paul Collier and Anke  Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in 
Post-conflict Societies,” and was published in the European Economic Review, vol. 48(2004) 1125-1145.  
3 The CollierandHoeffler study does not  distinguish by between relief assistance and other types of aid in the 
post-conflict decade, use four-year averages even though the entire post-conflict period covered for each country 
is no more than a decade (and in several cases less), and include cases that span almost three decades. Aid 
figures are from the OECD/DAC database International Development Statistics, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm.  All values are in constant US dollars (2002). Note that ODA 
includes only assistance in the form of grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element. Our work and that of  
Collier and Hoeffler therefore capture only part of the external assistance flow. 
4 The OECD data are disaggregated by sector. For "Relief Aid", we used emergency assistance+relief food 
aid+non-food emergency and distress relief. The last item also includes certain aid to refugees in donor 
countries, as there is no separate specification for this item. For "Development Aid" we used total ODA (all 
sectors), minus those we included in "Relief Aid". In the charts below, the respective post-war years for each 
country is coded as Year 1,2,3 etc. 
5 Their sample lists 2 civil wars for Nicaragua, although less than a decade intervenes between the end of the first 
(1979) and the beginning date of the second (1982). The same applies to Guatemala, where they list 2 wars with 
only 5 years of intervening peace. The result is a larger N than if a rule of one post-war decade had been rigidly 
applied.   For the analysis shown in Fig I, we used the 2004 version of their post-conflict sample, which includes 
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala (2), India, Indonesia, Morocoo, Nicaragua (2), Nigeria (2), Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
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“frontloaded” (Fig.I). Other types of aid – which we have lumped under the general heading 
of development aid - are gradually phased in to peak in the third year after the conflict ended. 
Admittedly, this aid then tapers off, and our findings are not necessarily inconsistent with a 
frontloading pattern if we aggregated the aid and used four-year averages. But from a policy-
analysis perspective the disaggregated result is more useful than the gross pattern in that it 
recognises the separate role of – and rationale for - humanitarian aid in the immediate post-
conflict period. The primary purpose of such aid is not to promote economic growth or indeed 
development generally. Rather it is to save lives in the short run. In this perspective, 
frontloading humanitarian aid is eminently rational and appropriate donor behaviour.  
 
The rapid decline of development assistance from the fourth post-war year seems to violate 
the declared policy intent of many donors to the effect that aid agents must situate post-war 
reconstruction in a long-term development perspective and demonstrate staying-power. The 
explanation may in part be technical: transfers recorded by OECD/DAC as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is above all concessional assistance; loans with less than a 
 
Fig I: Development and Relief Aid 
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25% grant element are not included. 6 Non-grant assistance may well increase in proportion of 
total aid as the post-war decade progresses and donors turn from the immediate tasks of 
reconstruction and peace implementation to “normal” development programs.  
  
Second, we took account of the fact that the international aid regime has changed dramatically 
in recent years. The end of the Cold War signified a systemic change in the aid regime. 
Initially ad hoc and programmatically incoherent, donor responses soon developed into a 
comprehensive, multilateral aid regime for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance 
designed to consolidate peace in the aftermath of civil wars and similar violent conflict. The 
change entailed a progressive standardisation of aid interventions with increasingly agreed-
upon formulas for the nature and sequencing of aid, improved coordination and clearer 
division of labour among aid agencies. As a measure of growing institutionalization, the term 
“post-conflict” had by the mid-1990s become a standard policy term used in the aid 
community as well as among scholars.7 When analysing aid patterns, it, therefore, makes 
sense to distinguish between post-conflict situations before and after 1990. This leaves us 
with a rather small sample in each group, but the results (Fig II and III) are nevertheless 
suggestive.8  In the "old conflicts" (which ended before 1990), both relief and development 
aid were phased in gradually. The frontloading characteristic does not appear until after the 
new aid regime took shape in the 1990s. The change reflects the greater international 
involvement in forging the series of peace agreements that ended the (internationally assisted) 
civil wars of the Cold War, as well as those following the break-up of the Soviet Union. All of 
these settlements had a comprehensive peace implementation agenda, and most came with a 
highly publicized donors’ conference, a sizable price tag and 2-4 year implementation periods 
that were presented to pledging conferences. As a result, peace implementation tended to 
became a frontloaded aid activity. 
 
                                                 
6 See footnote 4 above. In some cases donors came over time to prefer bilateral over multilateral channels. This 
was the case in Bosnia, where several donors preferred bilateral transfers in order to impose more stringent 
political conditionality that what the World Bank recommended (Hurtic, Sapcania and Woodward 2000, pp. 347-
50). 
7 The World Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit was established in 1994, the IMF followed with a post-conflict 
emergency assistance program in 1995. 
8  To get a minimally meaningful sample size, we collected data for all 26 countries on the long list of  
CollierandHoeffler (2003 version), and added Cambodia, Mozambique and Bosnia.  To get a longer post-conflict 
period in which to observe trends, we counted only 1civil war each in Guatemala and Nicaragua. This gave us 12 
new and 10 old conflicts. 
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Fig II. Old Conflicts – Development and Relief Aid 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Years
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
A
id
U
S
D
 M
il
li
o
n
-c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
$
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
R
e
li
e
f 
A
id
 
U
S
D
 M
il
li
o
n
-c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
$
Development Aid Relief Aid  
 
Although not addressed by the Collier and Hoeffler study, the distinction between 
disbursements and commitments is central to the post-war aid debate. The failure of donors to 
match promises with disbursement has been a serious source of tension in some recipient-
donor relations, as in post-Taliban Afghanistan (CIC/CARE 2004). Pledging conferences 
have been an important resource mobilization tool for the post-conflict aid regime, probably 
with the quite intended effect of driving up the level of funds committed. Whether or not a 
systematic gap between commitments and disbursements exists, is more unclear. Case study 
materials show a varied picture, with major gaps in some cases and virtually none in others 
 
Fig III New Conflicts – Development and Relief Aid  
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 (Forman and Stewart 2000). Using aid data from post- civil war aid in 12 “new” cases, (i.e. 
where the conflict ended after 1990),9 we found a marked disbursement gap in the early years 
after peace, but a subsequent narrowing. 10 By the middle of the post-war decade, 
commitments and disbursement levels converged, possibly reflecting increased awareness of 
recipient absorption capacity over time, fewer pledging conferences for the country in 
question, and donor fatigue more generally.  Fig IV also helps explain why it is widely 
assumed that aid is rushed in soon after peace is declared but then rapidly falls off.  The 
commitment curve follows the dynamic of frontloading – big promises are made in the early 
post-war years but then decline markedly - and big promises attract attention. Actual 
disbursements, by contrast, although steadier are less politically visible.  
 
Fig IV: Official Development Assistance: Commitments and Disbursements after 
“New” Conflicts 
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9 The cases are Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo, El Salvador, Guaremala, India, Morocco, Moazambique, Niaragua, 
Peru, Rwanda and Somalia. 
10 Figures used include both relief and development aid, i.e. ODA totals. If loans from the international financial 
institutions were included, the gap between commitments and disbursements might be greater. One careful study 
of post-war Cambodia found that the bilateral donors had a better disbursement rate than the international 
development banks, mainly because the latter were withholding funds when conditions such as local counterpart 
funding were not met. Overall, disbursement rates improved over time, from under 60% during the first three 
years of peace, to over 90% in later years. Peou 2000, p. 85.  
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2. Country cases 
 
What kind of interests and objectives shape the sequencing of post-war aid? Such aid is 
typically inserted in a deeply politicized context. The principal domestic actors are often 
recent enemies and remain protagonists in shaping the peace. International actors have 
frequently been involved in both waging the war and mediating the peace and have significant 
interests in securing a particular kind of post-conflict order. Peacebuilding strategies, in other 
words, are fundamentally political in nature, as several analysts have observed (Cousens et al. 
2001, Boyce 2003).  In this context, it seems unlikely that a”CNN effect” by itself will 
significantly determine the aid policies of donors. More likely, aid patterns will reflect 
strategic rationales of various kinds. Donor strategic considerations - political as well as 
economic - would seem to be particularly pronounced in the “new” post-conflict situations of 
the 1990s where the UN and the major donors were heavily involved in forging the peace 
settlements.  
 
To examine variations in aid patterns over time as well as among countries, we selected seven 
post-conflict cases for more detailed analysis. 11 This small-N qualitative approach enabled us 
to identify and explain the shape of the individual aid curves. As an expression of total 
assistance, each country aid curve typically masks a variety of donor interests and institutional 
concerns as well as different degrees of aid coordination. Nevertheless, each of the patterns 
that appeared seemed to suggest an overarching, coherent rationale.  Of the seven cases – 
Bosnia, Cambodia, the three Central American post-conflict countries, and Mozambique and 
Rwanda - the first two immediately stand out as contrasting cases in terms of both magnitude 
and timing of aid. We shall therefore first consider these two, and then turn to the remaining 
countries.  
(i) Bosnia and Cambodia  
 
The Bosnian post-war phase opened with the Dayton peace agreement, signed in December 
1995. As Fig V shows, except for one year, there is little difference between aid commitments 
                                                 
11 The CollierandHoeffler 2004 sample  again served as a starting point. Of their 17 civil wars, we excluded “the 
old” cases (which ended before 1990), as well as those that ended without a distinct, internationally supported 
post-war settlement. We added Rwanda, which was not classified as a civil war by Collier and Hoeffler because 
the 1990-94 war ended with genocide. We also added Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique – all major “new” 
post-war settlements with international involvement. Collierand Hoeffler lacked data for these countries on other 
dimensions of their analysis, and hence excluded them.  
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and disbursements. The remarkable aspect of the aid picture is the very high aid volume in the 
first four years, followed by a dramatic decline. While the curve does not suggest a sharp 
frontloading of aid – the build-up during the first 3 years after Dayton is rather steady – the 
mild frontloading is accentuated by the subsequent sharp reduction. The pattern can readily be 
explained with reference to deliberate aid strategies and political events. The World Bank, 
which along with the European Union had the primary institutional responsibility for 
organizing post-war aid to based, designed a strategy where early and massive infusions of aid 
for infrastructure reconstruction would “jump-start“ the economy (Hurtić, Šapačanin and 
Woodward 2000, World Bank 1996). This resulted in a 4-year Priority Reconstruction and 
Recovery Program (PRRP), formally launched at what turned out to be the first of several 
pledging conferences in December 1995. Over four billion dollars of the initial price tag of 
5.1 billion were disbursed. While this was only part of the overall aid picture, and did not 
cover a range of separately funded multilateral and bilateral projects, the PRRP set the stage 
for the overall aid effort. The mammoth aid program came to an end at the same time that the 
1999 crisis in Kosovo and subsequent NATO intervention occurred, which presented donors 
with competing priorities (year 4 on the chart). At the same time, disagreements among 
donors (particularly on conditionality), and delays (related donor requirements and 
institutional procedures as well as lagging cooperation on the recipient side) created a 
cumulative frustration  in the donor community over the difficulties and dysfunctionalities of 
an aid program involving massive transfers in the kind of environment that prevailed in post-
war Bosnia . Major media reports in mid-1999, although quite possibly exaggerated, 
concluded that aid had generated systematic, new corruption and helped sustain the power of 
wartime and pre-war elites in ways that did not further the Dayton agenda of democratic 
development, multiethnic reingegration, and economic recovery. The recognition that 
institutional developments had to precede liberalisation and effective utilisation of aid was 
gaining ground. So was awareness that Bosnia would be saddled with major new debt unless 
the grant element was increased. The various elements of the aid picture came together in a 
formal reassessment over priorities announced in the Brussels Declaration of the Peace 
Implementation Council in May 2000. The declaration outlined a change of aid strategy that 
entailed a lesser volume of monies and greater emphasis on institution building and economic 
reform (ESI 2000). 
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Fig. V Official Development Assistance – Bosnia and Cambodia 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Post-Conflict Year
U
S
D
 M
il
li
o
n
 -
 C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
$
Bosnia-
Committed 
Bosnia-
Disbursed
Cambodia-
Committed
Cambodia-
Disbursed
 
The high level of aid during the first four years is remarkable. It is about three times the aid 
disbursed in the equivalent post-conflict phase to Cambodia - a country with more than twice 
the population of Bosnia and arguably much more destruction, and where the international 
community a few years previously had been equally instrumental in bringing the conflict to an 
end. The aid engagement reflected the significance of Bosnia to the major donors and the 
huge political and social impact that the war had in Europe and the United States. More 
specifically, NATO's military intervention in the war and the US orchestration of the peace 
agreement had given the major donors a strong sense of ownership in the peace process. The 
Dayton Agreement was to a great extent "their" peace. The agreement and the government it 
left in place in Sarajevo represented a victory for US and European declared policies in 
Bosnia, and the donors had strong political incentives to secure their investment and 
demonstrate their commitment. Massive aid transfers, moreover, could seem to atone for past 
failures to prevent massacres of civilians and ethnic cleansing during the war. Important 
clauses of the peace agreement presumed external financial assistance, above all elections, 
demilitarization, and its opposite program of military assistance to the joint Federation army.  
The return of refugees and IDPs was an integral part of the Dayton Accords and expressed its 
underlying principle of restoring a multicultural Bosnia; this process also required financing, 
especially after 1998. Finally, donors also cited strong economic reasons for immediate and 
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large aid transfers, referring to the World Bank’s economic rationale of jump-starting the 
economy (World Bank 1996). The result was a virtual competitive rush to provide aid as soon 
as  the peace agreement was signed. 
 
In Cambodia, by contrast, aid levels were low and the aid was phased in slowly over the post-
war decade. The Paris peace agreement (October 1991) spelled out the desired sequencing in 
the appended Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia: “The 
implementation of an international aid effort would have to be phased in over a period that 
realistically acknowledges both political and technical imperatives.” (para 5). Why this 
cautious approach? The Vietnamese-supported incumbent regime of Hun Sen was weary of 
the intentions of the major donors. Hun Sen did not solicit major aid flows, evidently wanting 
to exercise maximum control over the post-war reconstruction program. The donors, for their 
part, concluded that after the destructive regime of Khmer Rouge and the at least nominally 
socialist regime of Hun Sen, Cambodia had few structures to support a market-based 
reconstruction program of the kind promoted by themselves and the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) (Paris 2000, pp. 82-83). Making haste slowly consequently made sense. As 
the aid program got under way, donors consistently – although not always correctly  – cited 
lack of absorptive capacity and effective administrative structures as reasons for delaying aid 
or providing only modest amounts (Peou 2000). Corruption was another major concern. Yet, 
with respect to governance and absorptive capacity, it appeared that the donor community 
held the Cambodia post-war government to higher standards than it was to apply later in other 
cases. The fact that the international post-conflict aid regime at this time was just taking 
shape, and Cambodia was one of its first cases, might also account for the slow pace and 
modest level of assistance. On closer examination, however, this factor explains little. The 
novelty factor did not prevent the UN from mounting one of its largest and at the time 
unprecedented peace missions (UNTAC). In economic aid, terms, moreover, another post-
conflict aid operation that took place towards the end of the decade was equally slow and 
modest (Guatemala).  
 
The underlying but fundamental reason behind donor hesitancy seems political.  The Paris 
peace agreement left in power the Vietnamese-installed and supported government of Hun 
Sen. None of the major donors supported the Hun Sen government, and the US vehemently 
opposed it for reasons related to its own defeat in Vietnam (Song 1997). The peace agreement 
was orchestrated by the large powers, but this was not “their peace” in the same way that the 
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Dayton agreement would be. All the major powers and donors (perhaps including Moscow), 
hoped that the elections scheduled for 1993 would bring to power a different government led 
by the erstwhile opposition to Hun Sen, and had little incentives to rush in aid in the 
meantime.  In the event, the 1993 elections produced an uneasy compromise and a coalition 
that included a still powerful Hun Sen. By the end of the decade, Hun Sen was still Prime 
Minister but had become more palatable to the donors (particularly in comparison with other 
Khmer political figures) and aid stabilized at a slightly higher level than in the first post-war 
phase. 
  
(ii) Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala 
 
The first of the Central American civil wars to come to an end, the Nicaraguan case attracted 
much attention and vast amounts of donor aid. On a per capita basis, the aid level in the post-
war decade was substantially above equivalent assistance to El Salvador and ten times higher 
than in Guatemala. The particular circumstances of the Nicaraguan peace settlement help to 
explain why. First, the war was terminated with a series of separate negotiations and pacts in 
which the 1990 elections assumed particular importance. The Sandinistas had agreed to abide 
by the election outcome, as had the political opposition, although not the armed opposition 
(the Contras). The unexpected loss of the Sandinistas made it easier to demilitarize the 
Contras, although this was not a foregone conclusion, and the transition from the Sandinistas 
to the “democratic conservatism” of the new, Chamorro-led coalition was fragile and 
uncertain. (Hartzell 2002, Anderson and Dodd 2005).  As a result, donors - above all the 
United States - transferred large amounts of aid to secure a favourable transition. A successful 
transition had implications for the region as well. Peace in Nicaragua was widely expected to 
promote a peaceful settlement of the other two civil wars in the region, and failure to have the 
opposite effect. The result was a distinctly frontloaded pattern (Fig VI). 
 
Having been deeply involved in the war, the United States had particular incentives to finance 
a transition that would entail the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, ensconce a US-friendly 
anti-Sandinista regime in power and facilitate the reintegration of Washington's previous 
Contra clients (Lopez-Pintor 1998, McCoy 1998). Generous aid was also a reward for the new 
government’s compliance with gruelling IFI-demands for structural adjustment. In the first  
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Fig VI. Official development assistance – El Salvador and Nicaragua 
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three years after the February 1990 elections, the donor community disbursed 1.89 billion 
dollars in concessional aid, of which the US alone provided 40%. In 1991, the first year of the 
Chamorro government, US bilateral aid recorded as official development assistance under the 
OECD/DAC rules was over 460 million US dollars.  In the same year, donors gave priority to 
democratic consolidation by collectively providing 350 million dollars in aid for 
“governance” alone. As the transition seemed secure, and the Sandinistas settled into the role 
of a tamed political opposition, US aid dropped markedly. By the time the Sandinistas had 
registered their second electoral defeat (in 1996), US aid levelled off to unremarkable figures 
(around 30-40 million dollars annually except for additional aid provided in the aftermath of 
hurricane Mitch in 1998). The Nicaraguan government in Managua, for its part, did not 
inspire sufficient confidence among other donors to attract massive aid. Apart from its 
cooperation on structural adjustment, the government was criticized by donors on many 
issues, including corruption, internal disagreement among the governing coalition partners -   
“raw confrontations over every issue” (Spence 2004, p.12) – and failure to make progress on 
social issues, particularly with anti-poverty measures (IOB 2003 pp. 56-65). 
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Post-war assistance to El Salvador, by comparison, was quite modest, especially on a per 
capita basis (see Fig VI). Apart from a large one-year commitment early on - which was not 
matched by disbursements - aid levels appear relatively stable throughout the post-war 
decade. The pattern is particularly interesting in view of widespread criticism of the early 
peace implementation process. Central parts of the peace agreement were tardily or only 
partly implemented, particularly the provisions regarding land-for-arms to resettle ex-
combatants on both sides, as well as police reforms and restructuring of other parts of the 
judicial system. The issues disrupted the implementation negotiations soon after the final 
agreement was signed, created social tension and contributed to high crime levels. To cope 
with crime waves but constrained by the slow pace of police reform, the government chose to 
deploy military units to maintain public order, thereby remilitarizing the social conflict. If 
money were the issue, this clearly would be a case for frontloading aid in order to secure a 
war-to-peace transition that was as fragile as in Nicaragua, although for different reasons. 
 
Why did donors not respond with large and early increases in funding? The national 
reconstruction plan presented by the government had an initial price tag of  $1.5 billion 
(1992), and increased to $1.8 billion in 1993; by early1994 there was a shortfall of $681 
million (Boyce 1996a, p.133). The funding gap reflected donor concern with a particular type 
of absorptive capacity, that is, lack of commitment and capacity by the government to 
implement central parts of the peace agenda (Boyce 1996, de Soto and del Castillo 1994, del 
Castillo 1997, Whitfield 2001). This affected both the land-for-arms exchange and police 
reform stipulated in the peace agreement. It was manifested in the government’s 
unwillingness to finance more than a fraction of its own national reconstruction plan (a 
modest $480 million of an estimated $1.8 billion), and its resistance to increase taxes and 
reduce military expenditures as donors suggested. The government also failed to institute 
compensatory mechanisms mandated by the peace agreement to cushion the costs of post-war 
structural economic adjustment called for by the IFIs, and which the regime itself  fully 
supported. 12  
                                                 
12 Influential critics have blamed inflexible IFIs, which demanded macroeconomic stability, and stingy donors 
who did not give government additional funds and thereby budgetary freedom to finance social programs. The 
result, it was claimed in a much-cited conclusion, was to set the World Bank and the IMF on a collision course 
with the UN-promoted peace process (de Soto and del Castillo 1994). Subsequent research, however, concluded 
that the government pursued an orthodox macroeconomic policy for reasons of its own and, within this 
budgetary framework, was unwilling to reallocate expenditure to finance social programs (Segovia 1996, Boyce 
1996a).  
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The consequences in terms of social tension and violence undoubtedly made the war-to-peace 
transition more difficult to the point of generating fears of renewed violence. Additional aid in 
this situation would have increased the government’s budgetary freedom but would not 
necessarily have eased the transition unless conditioned on reform. There was already some 
donor concern that external financing would “crowd in” domestic resource mobilization while 
leaving aside reform unless accompanied by effective conditionality (Boyce 1996a). The 
striking gap between commitment and disbursement in 1992 -a year of increasing tension and 
implementation problems with the peace agreement – indicates donor recognition that money 
alone would not suffice and expresses a soft conditionality implied by the withholding of 
promised funds.  
 
In the UN system, one of the lessons from El Salvador was the need to coordinate the 
economic and political aspects of peace negotiations. The World Bank and the IMF were 
brought into the UN-led negotiations at an early stage so they would not negotiate on a 
separate track for economic stabilization and adjustment, as happened in El Salvador. The 
general profile of post-war aid to Guatemala is nevertheless quite similar to that of El 
Salvador. The annual level in both cases is around the $250 million, although Guatemala has 
almost twice the population of El Salvador. Aid disbursements are steady, in fact almost 
identical year by year for an entire six-year period monitored after the 1996 peace agreement. 
Aid is not frontloaded, even though the peace agreement for Guatemala had a more ambitious 
agenda for socio-economic change than its Salvadorean equivalent. As in the Salvadorean 
case, donors held back in face of reluctance by the Guatemalan government to institute 
reforms related to the peace process, particularly institutional reform of the military and 
intelligence services and the police. The Guatemalan government was equally if not more 
resistant than the post-war Salvadorean government to increase taxes, despite repeated calls 
from donors and IFIs to this effect (Jonas 2000, chp.7).  In the circumstances, it was feared 
that additional foreign assistance would either be wasted or also in this case "crowd in" 
domestic resource mobilization.  
 
(iii) Mozambique and Rwanda 
 
The front-loaded pattern in Rwanda’s case (Fig VII) expresses a specific and unambiguous 
aid dynamic. The massive aid in the second half of 1994 and 1995 expresses the deep sense of 
guilt in the international community over its failure to stop or stem the genocide, as well as 
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the relief needs of the enormous refugee movements that followed in its wake. The abrupt 
decline in 1996-97 marks the new Rwandan government's fall from grace in the eyes of 
several donors as Rwandan troops invaded neighbouring Zaire (DRC) and were credibly 
accused of committing massacres among the refugee populations linked to the genocidaires. 
At the same time, the government launched its program of forced relocation of villagers, a 
program that came to cause considerable concern and criticism among donors (Wageningen 
2001). The steady but lower aid levels in subsequent years reflect conflicting views among the 
donors (Uvin 2001). Some invoked a continued obligation to help the victims of the genocide, 
represented by the new government, while others claimed that the authoritarian tendencies of 
that regime undermined the effectiveness of aid. The RPF-government's resistance to donor 
conditionality, and tendency to lay down a conditionality of its own for accepting aid, further 
cooled relations with donors.  
 
The large inflow of aid to Mozambique (Fig VII) in the first two post-war years was a direct 
response to the two-year program for implementing the 1992 peace agreement, and the 
particular significance that the transition in Mozambique had acquired after the failure of a 
similar peace process in Angola. The UN had been centrally involved in both cases, and 
Mozambique appeared as a  critical test. As in Bosnia, an external power - in this case Italy - 
had played a key role in organizing the peace negotiations and was prepared to take the lead 
in financing its implementation. The peace agreement was comprehensive and costly. It 
included a tight schedule for demobilisation and return of refugees, both of which were to 
precede and make meaningful the elections scheduled for 1994 (Hume 1994). The elections 
were particularly costly as the entire infrastructure for registration and voting had to be 
established in a country where close to 25 years of war had ravaged an already limited 
communications structure. Yet elections were essential to move the conflict between Frelimo 
and Renamo out of the military and into the political arena.  In addition, donors wished to use 
aid to stabilize the peace agreement by cushioning the effects of the IFI requirements for 
structural adjustment and macroeconomic stability. Unlike in El Salvador, there was a core of 
donor-government consensus on the need for budgetary outlays to institute  social reforms and 
use economic policy (e.g. increasing the minimum wage)  to soften the effects of the  
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Fig VII: Official Development Assistance - Mozambique and Rwanda 
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structural adjustment demands that the IFIs laid down soon after the peace agreement was 
signed. Key donors in this respect were long-time supporters of the socialist Mozambican 
government, especially the "like-minded group" led by the Scandinavians. Donors responded 
with political support as well; in 1995, for instance, donors collectively sought to modify IMF 
threats to end ESAF support (enhanced structural assistance funding) unless the government 
undertook further macroeconomic reforms (Ball and Barnes, p. 195). The result was a 
liberally funded peace agreement and initial measures to stabilize it. After the 2-year program 
for implementing the peace agreement had ended, aid subsequently reverted to general 
development assistance at the rate of  800-1000 million dollars annually. High in absolute 
terms (although less on a per capita basis, see Fig. VIII), the stable infusion of aid reflects the 
existence of faithful donors - particularly the "like-minded" countries - who consistently had 
supported the Mozambican government from the time of independence and throughout the 
war 
 
3. Post-war aid as strategic behavior 
 
As this analysis has shown, donors do not simply rush in with aid in the aftermath of war and 
then rapidly scale back. Although donors have been increasingly inclined to "frontload" aid 
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after 1990, especially in terms of commitments (as distinct from disbursements), on closer 
examination a variety of post-war aid patterns appear. The magnitude and sequencing of post-
war aid can in each case be explained with reference to political and economic interests of 
donors as these relate to - and are shaped by - the particular post-war context of the case. The 
country cases examined above suggest three main patterns. Sketched as   “ideal types,” each 
expresses a dominant strategic rationale. 
 
(a) stabilizing a favourable  peace: In this model,  major donors have particularly strong 
interests in securing a peace settlement that is favourable but fragile. In Nicaragua, a favored, 
friendly regime was contesting elections; in Mozambique, an internationally applauded war-
to-peace transition was fragile but had acquired great international symbolic significance as a 
"test case" (Mozambique); in Bosnia, the major powers had been prominently involved in 
both the war and in negotiating the peace and had vested interests in seeing the peace 
agreement implemented. In such cases, aid acquires great political and symbolic value. Apart 
from the humanitarian and economic rationale for financing items required by the peace 
agreement or identified as essential to relief and reconstruction, the overall function of aid is 
to stabilize and consolidate the peace. In part, this is done by funding particular projects such 
as supporting friendly parties in an election, buying out previous militia clients, helping 
refugees return to vote and ex-combatants to disarm, or giving military actors economic 
incentives to move into the political arena, as did the famous UN "slush-fund" established for 
Renamo. Importantly, the institutional and organizational activities that accompany a large aid 
portfolio - donors meetings and in-country coordination committees, pledging conferences, 
establishing aid agency offices and erecting project billboards in the countryside, and so on - 
serve as visible testimony to international support for the new order. It is the aid equivalent of 
the Powell doctrine of "overwhelming force", designed to stabilized a favourable but fragile 
peace. The design entails heavy front-loading of aid, but the magnitudes of the first post-war 
years are rarely sustained precisely because the initial response is considered an extraordinary 
measure and therefore of limited duration.  
 
b) modifying an unfavourable  peace: In other cases, major donors  have reservations about a  
peace agreement but accept it as the best possible compromise obtainable at the time, or as a 
useful starting point for change. The corresponding aid dynamic, as shown in the Cambodian 
case, is a slow phasing-in of modest levels of assistance, coupled with strict conditionality on 
economic and governance criteria. A slow phasing-in or over-all modest levels of post-war 
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aid may also suggest some indifference to the peace agreement or concern about lack of 
absorptive capacity. Both factors shaped the post-war aid policy to El Salvador and 
Guatemala. Whether intended or not, the effects contributed to a modification of the peace in 
the sense that central parts of the reform agenda of both agreements were not implemented. 
 
c) adjusting post-war policies: Once the initial peace (whether favourable or not) seems 
stabilized, other donor concerns about the developing the post-war order move to the 
forefront. This can entail reductions in relation to human rights criteria, governance measures 
or aid effectiveness.  When it became clear that the post-war regime in Rwanda was 
associated with massive human rights violations, regionalized conflict and internal political 
exclusion, several donors decided to reduce aid. The decline in aid gave the aid profile for the 
post-war decade as a whole a distinctly front-loaded profile. A similar non-sustained aid 
profile appears in Bosnia, reflecting in part concern with aid effectiveness.  
 
What, then, is the effect of these aid patterns on the stability of peace in the short run and its 
consolidation in the longer run? 
 
4. Post-war aid, growth and peace 
 
The answer given by Collier and Hoeffler and reaffirmed in a principal World Bank 
publication on conflict and development (2003) is straightforward. Economic growth is 
associated with peace - “aid tends, through its growth effects, to reduce the risk of conflict 
“(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004:1126). Aid allocations that both maximize growth and reduce 
poverty are even better instruments of peacebuilding . However, this requires proper timing 
and magnitude of assistance. Aid is particularly growth-effective if provided in great 
magnitudes and properly phased in. To achieve this effect, aid should not be frontloaded but 
“gradually rise during the first four years, and gradually taper back to normal levels by the 
end of the first post-conflict decade.” (Op.cit.;1142)  
 
Both premises on which this recommendation rests are controversial. The conclusion 
regarding the growth-effectiveness of aid in post-conflict countries is based on a small and 
quite heterogeneous sample. A retesting with slight variations in the sample produced a much 
smaller impact of aid on growth (120% less) (Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward, 2005). The 
diverging results indicate fragile relationships. As for growth and peace, there is a strong 
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connection between the wealth of a nation and the incidence of civil war (World Bank 2003, 
Humphreys and Varshney 2004, HSR 2005,) but it is less certain that the process of economic 
growth is a source of domestic peace. The claim by Collier and Hoeffler in this regard rests on 
a previous study that examined the causes of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Another 
study subsequently found that growth collapse was associated with subsequent conflict onset 
(Miguel et al 2004, cited in Humphreys and Varshney 2004). These findings may not be 
equally applicable to the risk of new violence in a post-conflict situation, however. Neither 
study makes allowance for the distinct nature of post-civil war situations, which include the 
legacy of previous violence such as a political economy of war and a culture of violence, 
physical destruction and issues of reconciling previous enemies. Even if the general statistical 
relation between growth and civil war found by Collier and Hoeffler applied, the numbers are 
discouraging. One percentage increase in economic growth reduces the risk of civil war with 
only one percent as well. Thus, if other indicators suggest a high risk of civil war – say 70% 
risk, as Collier and Hoeffler found for pre-DRC Zaire – a truly amazing growth rate of 20% 
would be required to bring the risk down to a fifty-fifty chance (Collier and Hoeffler 2002a). 
 
The qualitative literature places more emphasis on the kind of growth that is taking place, 
particularly its distributiver characteristics. One classic case is Pakistan’s civil war that led to 
the establishment of Bangladesh. The war was preceded and partly provoked by rapid 
economic growth that was unevenly distributed between the contesting regions (Muscat 
2002). Recent work by Frances Stewart points to the role of horizontal inequalities as a cause 
of civil war, and the importance of addressing such inequalities to prevent renewed new 
violence after the war (Stewart 2005). A systematic comparative study of post-conflict 
situations found that the typical growth strategies recommended by IFIs and donors in post-
conflict situations – reforms for macro-economic stability and market-oriented structural 
adjustment – tend to generate social conflict rather than social peace (Paris 2000). Earlier 
work by Boyce and colleagues concluded that socio-economic equality was a significant 
condition of reduced social violence (Boyce et al. 1996). 
 
Our seven country cases show no obvious relationship between economic growth and peace. 
Ten years after the war, all seven remain at peace in the sense understood by many civil war 
studies, including the World Bank research, that is, as not being at war.13 Yet post-war 
                                                 
13 Following the Singer and Small pioneering work on Correlates of War, Collier and Hoeffler define war as as 
sustaining 1000 combat deaths per year, with casualties incurred on both sides.   
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economic growth rates varied markedly during the first post-war decade. Measures as GDP 
per capita, growth rates fell into three distinct categories:14  
(i) boom and decline: Bosnia’s annual post-war growth rates starts with a high of  
79%, then drops to 32% and further drops radically in the third year after peace to 
hover around a 2% level. El Salvador follows a similar but much milder pattern. 
The reconstruction boom of around 5% drops in the fifth year of peace to the 0 –
2% range. 
(ii) stagnation: Some countries did not even experience a post-war boom, but settled 
straight into a dismally low rate. Guatemala’s growth rates ranged from slightly 
negative to plus 2%. Nicaragua had a negative growth rate of 2-3% during the first 
four years of peace, rising to 1-2% level and only surpassed 4% in 1999.  
(iii) steady growth: Only three countries have steady growth rates in the 3-7% range 
for most of the post-war decade, and higher in some years. Data for Cambodia’s 
first two post-war years (1992-93) are not available, but for most of the next nine 
years the economy grew steadily at 3-5%, only once dipping to around 1%, but 
rebounding the next year with a remarkable 8.3%.  Mozambique’s steady growth 
rate averaged 6% annually for the first seven years of peace. Interrupted by the 
severe floods in 2000, the growth rate was back to over 10% the following year.  
Rwanda had a marked post-war economic boom but avoided the boom-and-decline 
pattern by maintaining growth rates in the 3-6% range for most of the subsequent 
years.  
 
While it is hazardous to generalize from a small-N qualitative analysis, these cases show that 
a reasonably high and steady economic growth is neither a sufficient nor even a necessary 
condition for post-war peace. Nor does our sample show a straightforward relationship 
between economic growth and the quality of the post-war peace as indicated by UNDP’s 
human development index, HDI (Fig VIII).  Only one of the steady-growth cases (Cambodia) 
improved its HDI ranking during the first post-war decade, while the other two (Rwanda and 
Mozambique) fell further back. The two stagnating growth cases (Guatemala and Nicaragua) 
likewise slipped in HDI ranking position. The mild boom-and-decline case (El Salvador) 
improved its ranking, however. No comparable data are available for the more extreme boom-
and-decline case of Bosnia, but ample evidence of post-war stagnation – including large-scale 
                                                 
14 Based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2005 (CD-rom) 
 21
unemployment, illegal emigration and corruption – has made the area appear in other parts of 
the region as  “the black hole of Europe” (International Commission on the Balkans 2005). 
The effect of aid on the quality of peace likewise seems to be equivocal. As Fig VII shows, 
the highest recipients of ODA per capita in the post-war decade all slipped in their HDI 
ranking. The third largest recipient of aid, Mozambique, not only fell slightly, but remained 
almost at the bottom of the scale. Of course, the slippage might have been even worse without 
aid. But it is remarkable that the country which received least aid (Cambodia) was the only 
one that made significant upward gains on the HDI ranking  
 
Fig. VIII. Post-war aid, growth and the quality of peace 
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Since economic growth and large-scale aid are not necessary preconditions for post-war 
peace, aid strategies that prioritize economic growth in the post-war decade may well be 
inappropriate if the primary objective is to stabilize and sustain the peace. But does our small-
N qualitative analysis indicate which strategies are more effective in this respect?  
 
                                                 
15 Annual average per capita in the posty-war period, as shown in top row. Values in US 2002 dollars, rounded to 
nearest ,000. Population figure used is from a mid-point in the post-war period. 
16 Data for first year of peace not available. 
17 Data for first year of peace not available. 
18 The final peace agreement was signed in 1996, but peace negotiations in 1993 marked a significant decline in 
violence. 
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It is useful at the outset to make a distinction similar to that made by IFIs in economic policy 
between short-term stabilization and medium-to-long term adjustment. The equivalent of 
macro-economic stabilization would be peace stabilization, i.e., to secure elements of the 
peace agreement relating to the immediate transition from a military to a political mode of 
conflict. This would include the increasingly standardized aid programs established in post-
conflict situations, such as demobilization, return of refugees, reintegration schemes, and 
mechanisms for dealing with the conflict in political terms (elections, power-sharing), relief  
(especially for IDPs and refugees), and immediate reconstruction to provide evidence of a 
peace dividend and offer alternatives to the war economy. These stabilization schemes come 
with a price tag, which tend to produce a front-loaded aid profile. Rather than a problem, this 
strategy can be a solution. Targeted programs were critically important in stabilizing a fragile 
peace in several of our country cases. In Mozambique, well-placed aid helped secure 
demobilization prior to the elections, and early elections, with special funding assistance to 
the rebels, were essential to move the conflict into the political arena (CMI 1997). In 
Cambodia, a massive operation for early return of refugees ensured that the opponents of Hun 
Sen could not easily recruit manpower among the displaced masses on the Thai-Cambodian 
border to resume the military struggle (Williams 1997). In Nicaragua, huge aid inflows to 
secure and sustain electoral victory for the non-Sandinistas served, if ironically, to maintain 
the peace since the US probably would have continued its armed support for the Contras if the 
Sandinistas had retained governmental power (Hartzell 2002). By contrast, but to affirm the 
point, limited support for the lands-for-arms exchange in El Salvador, as well as related 
measures to provide employment and social security, seemed in 1992 sufficiently serious to 
jeopardize the newly concluded peace agreement(Wood 2003.).  
 
The importance of early, targeted aid programs to stabilize the peace has been emphasized in 
the general post-conflict literature as well (Woodward 2002). Their precise nature is likely to 
vary across cases, e.g. with employment creation being less important in Cambodia than in El 
Salvador, not to mention Bosnia. Whether massive frontloading of aid also has a general 
stabilizing effect on the peace, as the strategic rationale outlined above assumes, is more 
difficult to determine. As we have seen, aid patterns varied significantly among our seven 
cases, but peace was eventually sustained in all. Some cases nevertheless suggest that 
frontloading aid does have a general peace stabilizing effect, and vice versa. Of the seven, the 
most fragile post-war peace was probably in Cambodia, where the peace agreement was 
challenged militarily (by the Khmer Rouge) and politically (by the royalist faction). 
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Cambodia also stood out for its cautious and slowly phased in aid program. Although the UN 
mounted a large peacekeeping mission, donor decisions not to underwrite a generous aid 
program immediately probably had an encouraging effect on the regime’s opponents.  By 
contrast, in Nicaragua - another fragile peace situation - massive US aid signalled 
Washington’s desire to stabilize a particular peace and raised the cost for those favouring 
other outcomes.In Bosnia, early and massive aid commitment likewise underscored the 
importance the major donors attached to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.  
 
Although peace in the sense of no war has been sustained in all the seven cases, underlying 
structures of inequality or political exclusion associated with past violence remain in most 
cases. In some cases this has produced widespread, low-level forms of violence, as in 
Guatemala (Prophette et a. 2003), become transposed into regional conflicts pursued across 
borders, as seen in Rwanda’s role in neighbouring DRC (Longman 2002),  or the political 
economy of war has left a legacy of violence associated with the illegal economy whose 
effects are typically  magnified by massive post-war unemployment, as in Bosnia (Pugh et al. 
2004). If such structural sources of violence remain, what would be the equivalent of 
structural adjustment for peace? The diagnosis in part gives the answer. In all our seven cases, 
distributional issues were central, underlying causes of war, whether relating to classes 
(Central America), regions (Mozambique), ethnic groups (Rwanda) or ethno-political entities 
(the former Yugoslavia). Distributional issues concerned socio-economic goods as well as 
access to political power. Although the post-war situation obviously is not identical to the pre-
war situation, in terms of both local power relations and grievances and, perhaps above all, 
the international context, the proven violence-generating potential of structures of inequality 
and exclusion cannot be ignored. The consequent policy implication for post-war aid 
strategies is that structural adjustment for peace should focus on three broad areas: (i) modify 
systemic inequalities among groups (horizontal inequalities), (ii) promote institutional 
structures for inclusive political representation, and (iii) transform the structures of violence 
created by the war itself, whether associated with agents of the state or non-state actors. 
 
These policy implications may not be equally relevant for all post-war cases. Our sample does 
not include recent African conflicts (notably Sierra Leone, Liberia). If, or when, the post-war 
period is prolonged in these cases, the effect of aid interventions over time could be similarly 
assessed. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article has mapped the patterns of post-war aid with a view to identifying patterns of 
sequencing and magnitude. It found that contrary to other studies and conventional wisdom in 
aid circles, post-war aid is not always front-loaded immediately after peace is declared and 
then rapidly phased out. When this happens, the policy rests on a convincing strategic 
rationale and tends to have a stabilizing effect. Using a small-N qualitative analysis, we found 
that high levels of post-war aid and rapid economic growth are not necessary preconditions 
for sustained post-war peace. Nor are aid levels and economic growth rates clearly related to 
the quality of peace, as measured by the HDI. More important are the nature of aid strategies, 
which fall in two categories (i) strategies to stabilize peace in the short run through targeted 
programs, and, arguably, (ii) structural adjustment to sustain peace in the longer run that 
focuses on distributional issues and modifying the structural legacies of war.    
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